FedGrad: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning Through Local Ultimate Gradients Inspection
Federated learning (FL) enables multiple clients to train a model without compromising sensitive data. The decentralized nature of FL makes it susceptible to adversarial attacks, especially backdoor insertion during training. Recently, the edge-case backdoor attack employing the tail of the data distribution has been proposed as a powerful one, raising questions about the shortfall in current defenses' robustness guarantees. Specifically, most existing defenses cannot eliminate edge-case backdoor attacks or suffer from a trade-off between backdoor-defending effectiveness and overall performance on the primary task. To tackle this challenge, we propose FedGrad, a novel backdoor-resistant defense for FL that is resistant to cutting-edge backdoor attacks, including the edge-case attack, and performs effectively under heterogeneous client data and a large number of compromised clients. FedGrad is designed as a two-layer filtering mechanism that thoroughly analyzes the ultimate layer's gradient to identify suspicious local updates and remove them from the aggregation process. We evaluate FedGrad under different attack scenarios and show that it significantly outperforms state-of-the-art defense mechanisms. Notably, FedGrad can almost 100% correctly detect the malicious participants, thus providing a significant reduction in the backdoor effect (e.g., backdoor accuracy is less than 8%) while not reducing the main accuracy on the primary task.
PDF Abstract
CIFAR-10
MNIST
