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Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences
For the case of two alternatives, we extend existing results by proving that under very general assumptions, the uniform phantom mechanism is the only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies proportionality - a minimal notion of fairness introduced by Freeman et al. (2021).
The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May be Disjoint
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large.
A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
We give a robust characterization of Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games: Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies consequentialism, consistency, and rationality.
Balanced Donor Coordination
Charity is typically done either by individual donors, who donate money to the charities that they support, or by centralized organizations such as governments or municipalities, which collect the individual contributions and distribute them among a set of charities.
Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship
By weakening ex post efficiency and strategyproofness, we reduce the question of whether RSD is characterized by these axioms for fixed $n$ to determining whether a matrix has rank $n^2 n!^n$.
On Locally Rationalizable Social Choice Functions
More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally rationalizable if it is rationalized by a family of rationalizing relations such that a strict preference between two alternatives in some feasible set is preserved when removing other alternatives.
Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes
Secondly, we prove a continuous strengthening of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem: the less probability we put on Pareto-dominated alternatives, the closer to a random dictatorship is the resulting SDS.
Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i. e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i. e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships.
TetraPackNet: Four-Corner-Based Object Detection in Logistics Use-Cases
While common image object detection tasks focus on bounding boxes or segmentation masks as object representations, we consider the problem of finding objects based on four arbitrary vertices.
A Natural Adaptive Process for Collective Decision-Making
In fact, the probability that the collective decision in round $n$ is made according to a maximal lottery increases exponentially in $n$.
An Image Processing Pipeline for Automated Packaging Structure Recognition
Dispatching and receiving logistics goods, as well as transportation itself, involve a high amount of manual efforts.
Fully-Automated Packaging Structure Recognition in Logistics Environments
Within a logistics supply chain, a large variety of transported goods need to be handled, recognized and checked at many different network points.
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
Our proof is obtained by formulating the claim as a satisfiability problem over predicates from real-valued arithmetic, which is then checked using an SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) solver.
