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Found 10 papers, 0 papers with code
Parameterized Aspects of Distinct Kemeny Rank Aggregation
We also present FPT approximation algorithms for Kemeny rank aggregation with respect to these parameters.
Equitable Division of a Path
We show that achieving EQ1 in conjunction with well-studied measures of economic efficiency (such as Pareto optimality, non-wastefulness, maximum egalitarian or utilitarian welfare) is computationally hard even for binary additive valuations.
Fairness
Computer Science and Game Theory
A Parameterized Perspective on Protecting Elections
We study the parameterized complexity of the optimal defense and optimal attack problems in voting.
Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting
Opportunistic Manipulation (OM): the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in every viable extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators.
Preference Elicitation For Single Crossing Domain
The main contribution of our work is to provide polynomial time algorithms with low query complexity for preference elicitation in all the above six cases.
Elicitation for Preferences Single Peaked on Trees
We then investigate the query complexity for finding a weak Condorcet winner for preferences single peaked on a tree and show that this task has much less query complexity than preference elicitation.
On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers
For net approval and minisum approval voting rules, we provide a dichotomous result, resolving the parameterized complexity of this problem for all subsets of five natural parameters considered (by showing either FPT or W[1]-hardness for all subsets of parameters).
Backdoors into Heterogeneous Classes of SAT and CSP
In this paper we extend the classical notion of strong and weak backdoor sets for SAT and CSP by allowing that different instantiations of the backdoor variables result in instances that belong to different base classes; the union of the base classes forms a heterogeneous base class.
Frugal Bribery in Voting
However, the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem is intractable for all the voting rules studied here barring the plurality and the veto voting rules for unweighted elections.
Manipulation is Harder with Incomplete Votes
The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators.
