no code implementations • 5 Mar 2024 • Seungjin Han, Andrew Leal
This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA), an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can offer any arbitrary mechanism that specifies a transfer schedule for each agent conditional on all Agents' messages.
no code implementations • 21 Feb 2024 • Seungjin Han, Alex Sam
We study multidimensional signaling (cognitive/non-cognitive) as a sender's portfolio choice with a resource constraint.
no code implementations • 20 Sep 2023 • Seungjin Han, Siyang Xiong
In classical contract theory, we usually impose two assumptions: delegated contracts and perfect commitment.
no code implementations • 16 Mar 2023 • Seungjin Han, Alex Sam, Youngki Shin
This paper studies a delegation problem faced by the planner who wants to regulate receivers' reaction choices in markets for matching between receivers and senders with signaling.
no code implementations • 19 Sep 2022 • Seungjin Han, Julius Owusu, Youngki Shin
In this paper we study treatment assignment rules in the presence of social interaction.
no code implementations • 27 Sep 2021 • Seungjin Han
However, in the standard competing mechanism agme, the adoption of robust PBE as the solution concept does not lead to the full characterization of equilibrium allocations in terms of BIC direct mechanisms even with agents' separable utility functions.
no code implementations • 7 Sep 2021 • Seungjin Han, Alex Sam, Youngki Shin
We introduce a notion of competitive signaling equilibrium (CSE) in one-to-one matching markets with a continuum of heterogeneous senders and receivers.
